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Fromm’s Notion of Spontaneity as a 
Solution to Foucault’s Problem of Freedom
Abstract
In this paper, I attempt to apply Fromm’s notion of spontaneity to Foucault’s system of 
repression. It tends to shed new light on Foucault’s problem of freedom, using the notion 
which Foucault largely underestimates. Difficulties of such an application arise because 
of differences in Fromm’s and Foucault’s starting points in analysing the causes of human 
submission throughout history. Nonetheless, there is a point of convergence: Foucault and 
Fromm both describe a type of individual’s escape towards the institutions of power. Wheth-
er these institutions are highly formalised or not, highly complex or rather simple, dispersed 
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which highlights  spontaneity as  the core element of human  liberation, The 
Fear of Freedom.  In  this work, Fromm gives his psychological analysis of 
human attitude towards freedom. Insights from The Sane Society accompany 
this examination.



































“Totalitarianism  is  defined  strictly  in  terms  of  hard  techniques  of  coercion  (spying,  torture, 
arbitrary arrests, show trials, etc.), [while] the definition of ‘free societies’ is broadened to in-
corporate  all  forms  of  manipulation,  overt  or  covert,  though  they  might  accomplish  similar 
functions.”11


































Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Avail-
able  at:  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lib-
erty-positive-negative  (accessed  on  22  De-
cember, 2018).
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“[O]ne  is  free  in  the  positive  sense  to  the 
extent  that  one  has  control  over  one’s  life. 
In  this  sense  the  term  is  very  close  to  that 
of  ‘autonomy’.”  –  Gerald  Dworkin,  “Positi-
ve  and Negative Freedom”,  in: Robert Audi 
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Radical Philosophy Review 19 (2016) 2, pp. 
475–500, p. 475.
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maintaining  freedom  from  domination  by 
those institutions that claim to know the truth 
about  individuals.”  –  Stephanie  M.  Batters, 
“Care  of  the  Self  and  the  Will  to  Freedom: 
Michel  Foucault,  Critique  and  Ethics”,  Sen-
ior Honors Projects,  2001,  p.  13. Available 
at:  https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonor-
sprog/231/ (accessed on 30 December, 2018). 




cording  to  Foucault,  the  individual  identity 











power  that  shifts and controls him;  social  control  is  an  important concept 
of his, for which several examples can be provided. In Will to Knowledge, 
Foucault  asserts  sexual  oppression  as  a  means  of,  primarily,  “social  con-
trol”.18 Elsewhere, Foucault  asserts  that  even  the opposite  –  the  free pro-
duction of sexual discourse – has  the same function.19  In The Birth of the 






system.21 This  inevitable  societal  power over  an  individual,  or  social  de-
terminism, leads Foucault to a sort of pessimism. Even the most renowned 
writers  on  Foucault  acknowledge  his  “pessimistic  assessment  of  moder-
nity”22  or his  “pessimistic  suggestion  that modern power  (…) produc[es] 
subjects”.23













made. The  former  analyses how  the power arises  from an  individual  and 
how the individual then hands it over to someone else (“escape from free-








is taken from or given to an individual,30 while Foucault analyses how the 
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Freedom throughout History and 






is  created  through  a  system  of  socialization 
over which we have relatively little control.” 



















coextensive  with  the  function  of  the  social 
body and with each of its elements.” – Michel 





the  History  of  Subjectivity”,  in:  Gary  Gut-




Jana  Sawicki,  “Queering  Foucault  and  the 
Subject  of  Feminism”,  in:  G.  Gutting  (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, pp. 
379–401, p. 383.
24
“Fromm’s  optimistic  conviction  that  human 











“Erich  Fromm’s  prophetic  messianic  hope 
rests  at  the  core  of  his  philosophical,  psy-
choanalytic, and political program.” – Kieran 
Durkin,  The Radical Humanism of Erich 
Fromm,  Palgrave  Macmillan,  New  York 
2014, p. 204; “[T]otal  liberation  [is]  the ba-
sic aim of Fromm’s radical humanism (…).” 
–  Joan  Braune,  “Erich  Fromm  and  Thomas 
Merton:  Biophilia,  Necrophilia,  and  Mes-
sianism”, in: Seyed Javad Miri, Robert Lake, 
Tricia M. Kress  (eds.), Reclaiming the Sane 




Escape from Freedom  is  an  alternative  title 
of Fromm’s work discussed here, The Fear of 
Freedom.
29
Thomas L. Dumm, Michel Foucault and the 
Politics of Freedom,  Rowman  &  Littlefield 
Publishers,  Lanham  –  Boulder  –  New York 
– Oxford 2002, p. 71.
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“[T]he  individual  is made  to  feel powerless 
and insignificant, but taught to project all his 






his  own  powers  (…)  but  as  (…)  dependent 
on powers outside of himself, unto whom he 





cised.” – P. Oliver, Foucault – The Key Ideas, 
p. 46.
32
E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, p. 26.
SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA 
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Nowadays, we have  the processes of  creating  “an  apparatus  for producing 
(…) discourse about sex”,44 and thus any sexual revolution is lost before it has 
even begun, because of the proliferation of scandalous discourses that ensure 






be  the  spontaneity:  for,  what  is  repression  (especially  in  the  form  of  laws 
SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA 
67 (1/2019) pp. (125–139)
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have  not  yet  achieved  “freedom  to”  (freedom  to  express  our  individuality 
completely and in a creative way; positive freedom).47 Foucault, on the other 






and practices of  punishment.50 Discipline  as  a  form of  repression has  also 
33
I will principally refer to his thoughts in Will 






coextensive  with  human  society.”  –  Charles 
Taylor,  “Foucault  on  Freedom  and  Truth”, 
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“[T]he central issue of the effects of capital-
ism  on  personality  [is]  the  phenomenon  of 
alienation.”  –  E.  Fromm,  The Sane Society, 
p. 117.
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“Fromm  was  not  a  naive  humanist  (…).” 
– K. Durkin, The Radical Humanism of Erich 
Fromm,  p.  130;  “[Fromm]  was  not  naive 
about how arduous a struggle it would be to 
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[human] needs.” – Nick Braune, Joan Braune, 
“Erich  Fromm’s  Socialist  Program  and  Pro-
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Adorno, “Preface”, in: Dialectic of Enlighten­
ment,  translated  by  Edmund  Jephcott,  Stan-
ford  University  Press,  Stanford  2002,  pp. 
XIV–XIX, p. XIV.
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S.  Prozorov,  Foucault, Freedom and Sover-
eignty, p. 148.
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The  same  representativity  stands  for  his 
works The Birth of the Clinic and Discipline 




















lar  to  those  exercised  by  the  clergy  over 




its  intensity,  but  at  the  cost  of  greater  inter-


















































































The Quality of Repression and 






“[The discipline]  increases  the  forces of  the 





coming  true;  the  goal  of  this  paper  is  not 


















It  is  more  explanatory  to  say  “dispersed 
power”,  which  is  also  an  important  concept 
at  Foucault,  as  many  of  his  commentators 
agree. Cf. Joseph Rouse, “Power / Knowled-
ge”,  in:  G.  Gutting  (ed.),  The Cambridge 
Companion to Foucault, pp. 95–123, p. 110; 
David Ingram, “Foucault and Habermas”, in: 










Chapters  “The  Two  Aspects  of  Freedom 
for  Modern  Man”  from  Fromm’s  The Fear 













































fication of an  individual: chiefly,  the modification of  individual’s  self-con-
sciousness. All these modifications are the modifications related to freedom, 
as both Fromm and Foucault notice and elaborate. Both of them agree that 
one kind of  repression  is  eliminated  throughout  these 300 years, while  the 
other problem was set in the 20th century. However, the two authors see this 
problem differently: Fromm asserts that a 20th-century individual has gained 





































E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destruc-
tiveness, p. 241.
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E.  Fromm,  “Mechanisms  of  Escape”,  in:  E. 












cedures, not  in  the  form of enclosed  institu-
tions, but as centres of observation dissemi-
nated  throughout  society.”  –  M.  Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish, p. 212.
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“[T]he  great  European  Revolutions  of  the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries failed to 





in  order  to  obtain  an  efficient  machine.” 
– M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 164; 
“[D]ecentralization  is  associated  with  (…) 
repression.” – M. Foucault, The Birth of the 
Clinic, p. 48; “[A] presum[ption] that there is 
an opposition between normalizing strategies 
and  the establishment of modern  rights  (…) 
is mistaken.” – T. L. Dumm, Michel Foucault 














Punish,  p.  27:  “…  power  produces  knowl-
edge (…) power and knowledge directly im-
ply one another  (…)  there  is no power rela-
tion without the correlative (…) knowledge.” 
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in  Foucault’s  work,  the  authorities  are  the  experts  who  are  rarely  brought 














The  conclusion  about  freedom and  repression  in  the  (post)modern  society, 
again, exposes a similarity between Fromm and Foucault. They both argue 
that modern liberal democracies, doing as they do, conceal their power. The 
subjects  of  modern  democracies  suppose  they  are  free  while  they  are  still 






ter of The Fear of Freedom, which holds a suggestive title, “The Illusion of 









hopes  that  the  spontaneity,  i.e.  our  prowess,  is  a  kind  of  salvation  for  hu-
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Heidegger  and  Nietzsche”,  in:  G.  Gutting 
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It  must  be  taken  into  consideration  that 
Foucault  is  not  insisting  that  the  power  is 
solely  formally  institutional  or  directly  top-
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Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, pp. 178–206.
90
M. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, p. 36–
37.
91




















































inevitable  subject  for both authors,  in The Fear of Freedom and The Sane 
Society  by  itself,  and  in Will to Knowledge  and other Foucault’s works by 
its necessary implications: power and repression are categories which neces-
sarily entail the problem of freedom, which is why Johanna Oksala notices 









Frommov pojam spontanosti kao 
rješenje problema slobode kod Foucaulta
Sažetak
U radu pokušavam primijeniti Frommov pojam spontanosti na Foucaultovu teoriju sustava re-
presije. Ovom analogijom pokušava se iznova sagledati Foucaultov problem slobode, pomoću 
pojma koji Foucault uglavnom zanemaruje. Osnovna je teškoća takvog pristupa u različitim 
polazištima dvojice autora pri analizi uzroka ljudske podčinjenosti kroz povijest. Unatoč tome, 
članak će pokazati da je moguće pronaći točku konvergencije između Fromma i Foucaulta: oba 
autora opisuju svojevrsni bijeg pojedinca prema institucijama moći. Bilo da su te institucije for-
maliziranije ili rudimentarnije, raspršene ili centralizirane, zajednička im je osnova represija 
utemeljena na izbjegavanju bilo kakve spontanosti.
Ključne riječi
sloboda, spontanost, moć, represija, Erich Fromm, Michel Foucault
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Luka Domjanović
Fromms Begriff der Spontaneität als 
Lösung für Foucaults Problem der Freiheit
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel versuche ich, Fromms Begriff der Spontaneität auf Foucaults Unterdrü-
ckungssystem anzuwenden. Er neigt, ein neues Licht auf das Problem der Freiheit bei Foucault 
zu werfen, indem er den Begriff verwendet, den Foucault weitgehend vernachlässigt. Schwierig-
keiten bei einer solchen Anwendung ergeben sich aus dem Unterschied zwischen Fromms und 
Foucaults Ausgangspunkten bei der Analyse der Ursachen für menschliche Unterwerfung im 
Laufe der Geschichte. Nichtsdestotrotz haben die Autoren einen Punkt der Konvergenz: Sowohl 
Foucault als auch Fromm beschreiben eine Art der Flucht des Individuums zu den Institutionen 
der Macht. Unabhängig davon, ob diese Institutionen hoch formalisiert oder nicht, hochkom-





La Notion de spontanéité de Fromm 
comme solution au problème de liberté de Foucault
Résume
Dans cet article, je tente d’appliquer la notion de spontanéité de Fromm au système répressif 
de Foucault. Par cette analogie, nous cherchons à éclairer de nouveau le problème de la liberté 
chez Foucault, en utilisant la notion que Foucault sous­estime largement. Les difficultés d’une 
telle application sont dues à la différence des points de départ de Fromm et de Foucault dans 
l’analyse des causes de la soumission humaine à travers l’histoire. Néanmoins, les deux auteurs 
ont un point de convergence : Foucault et Fromm décrivent tous deux un type de fuite de l’indi-
vidu vers les institutions du pouvoir. Que ces institutions soient hautement formalisées ou non, 
très complexes ou plutôt simples, dispersées ou centralisées, elles désignent la répression en 
raison de leur manque de spontanéité.
Mots-clés
liberté, spontanéité, pouvoir, répression, Erich Fromm, Michel Foucault
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